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Abstract
I study the limit of a large random economy, where a set of consumers invests
in financial instruments engineered by banks, in order to optimize their future con-
sumption. This exercise shows that, even in the ideal case of perfect competition,
where full information is available to all market participants, the equilibrium develops
a marked vulnerability (or susceptibility) to market imperfections, as markets approach
completeness and transaction costs vanish. The decrease in transaction costs arises be-
cause financial institutions exploit trading instruments to hedge other instruments.
This entails trading volumes in the interbank market which diverge in the limit of
complete markets.
These results suggest that the proliferation of financial instruments exacerbates the
effects of market imperfections, calling for theories of market as interacting systems.
From a different perspective, in order to prevent an escalation of perverse effects,
markets may necessitate institutional structures which are more and more conspicuous
as their complexity expands.
1
”As products such as futures, options, swaps, and securitized loans become
standardized and move from intermediaries to markets, the proliferation of new
trading markets in those instruments makes feasible the creation of new custom-
designed financial products that improve market completeness, to hedge their
exposures on those products, the producers (typically, financial intermediaries)
trade in these new markets and volume expands; increased volume reduces
marginal transaction costs and thereby makes possible further implementation
of more new products and trading strategies by intermediaries, which in turn
leads to still more volume. Success of these trading markets and custom prod-
ucts encourages investment in creating additional markets and products, and
so on it goes, spiraling toward the theoretically limiting case of zero marginal
transactions costs and dynamically complete markets.” [3].
The idea that the optimal allocation of goods and resources can be achieved through
the expansion of financial markets has deep roots in neo-classical economic theory [1, 2]. In
brief, General Equilibrium Theory (GET) maintains that utility and profit maximization,
under perfect competition, ensures optimal outcomes only if all markets exist. In a non-
deterministic world, this entails a quite unrealistic requirement, namely the existence of
contingent commodity markets, i.e. markets, open today, for the delivery of any good at
any future date, in any possible state of the world.
In this framework, financial markets play an important roˆle, as they substitute for
missing contingent commodity markets, by allowing agents to allocate their wealth to
cope with the uncertainty of future spot market prices (see [1, 2]). In particular, when
the repertoire of trading instrument expands, financial markets approach completeness1,
and decentralized utility maximizing behavior achieves GET (Pareto) optimal allocation
outcomes.
This theoretical construction sharply contrasts with the 2007-2008 experience, where
different forms of market imperfections have played a major role in turning expanding
credit derivative markets into ”financial weapons of mass destruction” [4].
Most concerns have focused on the distortions in how financial engineering has been
applied, rather than on its theoretical foundations. Several authors have pointed out issues
of misaligned incentives, asymmetric information, moral hazard and lack of transparency
[5, 6, 7, 8]. Such a focus on “market imperfections” calls for institutions which can avoid
the escalation of perverse effects, leading to systemic crisis. Quoting again from Ref. [3]:
”When particular transaction costs or behavioral patterns produce large de-
partures from the predictions of the ideal frictionless neoclassical equilibrium
for a given institutional structure, new institutions tend to develop that par-
tially offset the resulting inefficiencies. In the longer run, after institutional
1We recall that a complete market is one where any contingent claim can be replicated by a portfolio of
traded assets.
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structures have had time to fully develop, the predictions of the neoclassical
model will be approximately valid for asset prices and resource allocations”.
In this perspective, developments in financial engineering are part of the solution, not of
the problem2 Indeed, in a perfectly competitive market, where full information is available
to all market participants, the “financial innovation spiral” [3] can expand the repertoire of
financial instruments, approaching the ideal of a complete market in which any contingent
claim can be replicated by a portfolio of traded assets.
This paper focuses on a theoretical realization of this program, and it analyzes the prop-
erties of an economy as financial markets approach completeness. We set ourselves in the
ideal – and seemingly implausible – long-term scenario where institutions can be designed
to guarantee perfect competition, with full information available to all participants.
The model we focus on is conceptually simple: it describes a single period economy
where consumers aim at allocating optimally their wealth in an uncertain future, buying
financial instruments which are developed and offered by financial firms – banks for short –
in a competitive financial sector. This rather standard setting (see e.g. [10]) is investigated
in the complex case of a large random economy, where the number of states and the number
of financial instruments both grow very large. In particular, we derive results for ensembles
of markets where financial instruments are drawn from a given probability distribution. Put
differently, banks develop new instruments through a genuine innovation process, modeled
as a random draw of a new asset.
Taking advantage of statistical physics of disordered systems we are able to characterize
the typical properties of the equilibrium in terms of self-averaging quantities (i.e. quantities
which satisfy laws of large numbers), and of the relations between them.
The main result of the paper is that the limit when markets become complete is a
singular one. In the space of parameters it separates a stable, arbitrage-free region, from
an unstable one. The proliferation of financial instruments brings the market closer to the
unstable region, thus eroding systemic stability. This entails vanishing transaction costs
(risk premium) which arise from the fact that banks can avail of existing assets to hedge the
risks of new financial instruments. In a competitive market, the risk premium charged by
banks is proportional to the residual risk, which vanishes as the market becomes complete.
Stability is quantified, in this approach, by the susceptibility of the equilibrium, i.e. its
sensitivity to parameter specification, which diverges as the boundary of the stable and
unstable region is approached. Such enhanced susceptibility is also what makes it hard,
for an adaptive consumer to correctly learn how to invest optimally, when markets are
close to being complete. This result is reminiscent of the one discussed in [11], who show
that the introduction of financial instruments in a market with heterogeneous traders, may
2Quoting from R. J. Schiller “The history of finance over the centuries has been one of gradual expansion
of the scope of markets. Over time, more and more kinds of risks are traded, and there are more and more
opportunities for hedging those risks. Now is the time to encourage the further development of markets in
a way that truly democratizes them, that is, so that the markets cover the specific risks that ultimately
matter to individual people.” [9].
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destabilize the market making it harder for adaptive expectations to converge3. Indeed,
the origin of the instability does not lie in the learning dynamics. It is rather a property
of the equilibrium itself.
One particularly catastrophic effect is that, replicating portfolios used by banks to
hedge new instruments, require trading volumes, within the financial sector, which diverge
as the market approaches completeness4. Furthermore, the interbank market itself develops
a divergent susceptibility, as the theoretical limit of complete markets is approached.
In summary, the main point of the paper is that, even in an ideal world, the expansion
of financial instruments may bring detrimental “unintended consequences” for systemic
stability and, in particular, it may exacerbate the effects of market imperfections. In order
to prevent an escalation of perverse effects, markets may necessitate institutional structures
which are more and more conspicuous as they expand. At the same time, the increased
sophistication of financial markets calls for theories of financial markets as interacting
systems, going beyond the ideal limit of perfect competition.
1 The model
In this paper, assets are vehicles for transferring wealth from an initial time t = 0 (e.g.
today) to a future date t = 1 (e.g. tomorrow) [10]. There are K risky assets whose price
s0k (k = 1, . . . ,K) is known at t = 0. The prices of assets at t = 1, are instead unknown
and are modeled as random variables: We assume the market at t = 1 can be in one of
Ω possible states ω = 1, . . . ,Ω, each occurring with probability πω. Correspondingly, the
price of each asset k is s0k + r
ω
k at t = 1, if state ω materializes. There is also a risk-less
asset (bond) which also costs one today and pays one tomorrow, in all states5. Perfect
competition entails that prices are (considered as) exogenous variables, i.e. independent
of the behavior of traders. All market participants know the statistics of prices, i.e. they
know rωi for all i and ω and they know the probability π
ω, but they do not know which
state will materialize.
1.1 The financial industry
Assets are produced – or engineered – by financial institutions, either as means to raise
investment for firms (equities or stocks) or as means to insure investors against potential
risks (e.g. derivatives). For our purpose, the only difference between different types of
stocks is the expected return: The expected return of stocks is generally positive Eπ[r] > 0,
whereas for a financial instruments designed by cover some risk (derivatives), banks will
ask for a risk premium, i.e. Eπ[r] < 0.
3A similar conclusion is reached in a different class of models of in Ref. [12].
4A different mechanism for a “lending boom” in credit derivative markets is discussed in [13].
5This is equivalent to considering, for the sake of simplicity, discounted prices right from the beginning.
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We assume that banks develop a number N of financial instruments (assets) which are
offered to investors. Asset i = 1, . . . , N has a return rωi in state ω = 1, . . . ,Ω. For the sake
of simplicity, we are going to take assets with the same risk premium, i.e. we posit that
Eπ[ri] =
Ω∑
ω=1
πωrωi = −
ǫ
Ω
. (1)
In what follows, returns rωi are taken as i.i.d. random variables with variance 1/Ω, satisfying
Eq. (1). We shall come back later to a discussion of the risk premium. For the moment
being ǫ will just be considered as a fixed parameter6. As we shall see below, not all assets
developed by the financial industry will be traded in the market.
It is worth to remark that innovation in the financial industry is equivalent, in this
setting, to a new independent draw from the distribution of assets, which expands the
repertoire of available assets N → N + 1. The assumption of independence of the N +
1st financial instrument from the N existing ones, may be unrealistic. However, as we
shall see, whether an innovation is actually adopted (i.e. traded) or not, depends on the
whole repertoire of traded assets. Hence, a new successful financial innovations is not an
independent draw. At any rate, our aim is not that of reproducing realistic behavior, but
rather that of exploring the consequences of the proliferation of financial instruments in an
ideal setting. In this respect, our model definitely captures a genuine discovery process in
the financial industry.
When N and Ω are large, as it will be assumed below, this setting reproduces a situation
of great financial complexity.
In this setting, we shall focus on the behavior of the market in terms of two key
parameters:
• the financial complexity n = N/Ω, measured by the number of different financial
instruments provided by banks, and
• the risk premium ǫ.
Competition in the financial industry will likely push the market towards higher values of
n and smaller values of ǫ (see Section 3)
1.2 Optimizing future consumption
We imagine there is a population of consumers, described for simplicity by a single repre-
sentative consumer, whose aim is to maximize the expected utility of consumption Eπ[u(c)]
at t = 1. Smooth preferences, represented by a monotone increasing, convex utility func-
tion u ∈ C2, are assumed throughout the paper. The quantity cω of consumption good
which consumers secure in state ω depends on the wealth wω1 they have at t = 1 and on
6The dependence of the statistics of rωk on Ω is designed to have a meaningful limit Ω→∞ (see below).
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the price pω of the good in state ω: cω = wω1 /p
ω. We assume pω are exogenously given.
Specifically, they are drawn independently for each state ω from a given distribution. The
wealth wω1 results from the investment of the initial (t = 0) wealth w0 of consumers in the
financial market. We take for simplicity w0 = 1 in what follows. Then, if zi ≥ 0 is the
quantity of asset i bought by consumers,
wω1 = 1 +
N∑
i=1
zir
ω
i . (2)
The portfolio weights zi ≥ 0 are given by the solution of the optimization problem
max
~z≥0
Eπ
[
u
(
1 +
∑
i zir
ω
i
pω
)]
. (3)
In brief, the consumers exploit the financial market to carry their wealth from t = 0 to
t = 1 in an optimal manner, in order to cope with the uncertainty of commodity prices7.
Inspection of the first order conditions of the problem above reveals two important facts:
i) The consumer will select a subset of K ≤ N assets which will be traded, whereas all the
others will have zi = 0. ii) If a finite solution to the optimization problem (3) exists, then
the subset of K traded assets is arbitrage free, i.e. there exist an Equivalent Martingale
Measure (EMM) qω such that Eq[ri] = 0 for all assets i which are traded (zi > 0). This is
because the optimality conditions read
∂
∂zi
Eπ [u (c
ω)] =
∑
ω
πω
u′(cω)
pω
rωi
{
= 0 ⇔ zi > 0
< 0 ⇔ zi = 0 (4)
which implies that the EMM is given by
qω = πω
u′(cω)
Qpω
, Q =
∑
ω
πω
u′(cω)
pω
. (5)
Notice that, non traded assets (zi = 0) have Eq[r
ω
i ] < 0, i.e. the price of these instruments
(s0i ) is higher than their value s
0
i +Eq[r
ω
i ], according to the EMM, and hence they are not
bought by consumers.
2 Typical behavior of a large complex market
What are the properties of the market resulting from the interaction between the financial
industry and consumers? How, in particular, do these properties change as a function of
financial complexity n = N/Ω and of the risk premium ǫ?
7This set up is rather standard in Asset Pricing Theory [10]. In a General Equilibrium setting, the
financial market substitutes missing contingent commodity markets, i.e. markets, cleared at t = 0, for
delivering every commodities at t = 1 in each state ω. We refer the interested reader to the literature on
Radner or sequential equilibria [1].
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This question can be answered precisely, in the limit of large random markets Ω→∞,
because E[u(c)] is expected to satisfy the law of large numbers, i.e. to have a self-averaging
behavior. Statistical physics of disordered systems provide the tools to both identify the
relevant self-averaging variables – the so-called order parameters – as well as the relations
coupling them. This approach can be made rigorous following the approach of [14]. Our
interest here is on the behavior of the economy rather than on the mathematics involved,
so we shall provide only essential details. The method and the explicit calculation for a
problem very similar to (3) is discussed in detail in [15], to which the interested reader is
referred. A short account is given in the appendix.
2.1 The arbitrage-free region
Before discussing the general properties of the solution, it is worth to discuss the region
where one expects it to exist. Indeed, a solution does not exist if the market is not
arbitrage-free, i.e. if investors can buy a portfolio of assets ~ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζN ), with ζi ≥ 0,
such that
rωζ =
N∑
i=1
ζir
ω
i ≥ 0, ∀ω = 1, . . . ,Ω (6)
and rωζ > 0 for at least one state ω. One can compute the volume
V (n, ǫ) =
∣∣∣∣∣
{
~ζ ≥ 0 :
N∑
i=1
ζir
ω
i ≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω
}∣∣∣∣∣ (7)
of portfolios satisfying Eq. (6) following the same approach as in [15]. An account of
the necessary steps is given in appendix A.2. In brief, one expects that V (n, ǫ) = 0 in
the arbitrage free regions, whereas outside this region V (n, ǫ) ∼ DN should shrink as
the boundary between the two regions is approached, with D = |~ζ1 − ~ζ2| being the typical
distance between two possible portfolios satisfying Eq. (6). The dependence on N suggests
that the quantity with a self-averaging behavior is 1N log V (n, ǫ).
The analysis of this quantity, averaged over the ensemble of realizations of the economy
(i.e. on rωi and p
ω) leads to the boundary of the arbitrage free region, which is shown in
Fig. 1.
For ǫ > 0 the market is always arbitrage free, as banks demand a positive risk premium
for all assets. When ǫ < 0, instead, as the number of assets introduced by banks increases,
the market approaches a state where an arbitrage appears with probability one. The
properties of the economy are radically different when the boundary is approached for
ǫ < 0 or for ǫ > 0.
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Figure 1: Phase diagram of the economy. The equilibrium is unstable in the shaded region
on the bottom right. The dashed and dotted lines correspond to “trajectories”, where
the risk premium ǫ is determined endogenously, as discussed in Section 3, with γ = 0.05
(bottom) and γ = 0.1 (top).
2.2 Approaching complete markets
A similar analysis can be applied to Eq. (3), as discussed in the appendix. Let us focus
our discussion on the behavior of the following quantities
R =
ǫ
Ω
N∑
i=1
zi, σ
2
q = Ω
Ω∑
ω=1
(qω − πω)2 , φ = |{i : zi > 0}|
Ω
(8)
which are respectively the total revenue R of the financial sector, the deviation of the EMM
from the empirical measure and the degree of market completeness. Note, in particular,
that φ = 1 corresponds to a situation where the number of traded assets equals the number
of states, i.e. to complete markets.
In addition, one quantity which turns out to play a key role is the susceptibility. In
order to define this quantity, one first introduces a small variation in the utility E[u(c)]→
E[u(c)] +~h · ~z. Then one computes the variation of the solution ~z(~h) of the corresponding
optimization problem
χ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∂zi
∂hi
∣∣∣∣∣
~h=0
(9)
for vanishing ~h. χ measures the sensitivity of the solution ~z to the parameters which specify
the original problem8.
8χ captures sensitivity wrt the definition of the utility function. Likewise, it is possible to define the
8
The analysis of the optimization problem, discussed in appendices A.1 and A.1.3, allows
us to state the following:
The locus on which markets become complete coincides with the line ǫ = 0,
n ≥ 2 which separates the no-arbitrage region from the unstable one. In the
limit of complete markets, i.e. as φ→ 1−,
1. The equilibrium becomes more and more fragile, in the sense that the
susceptibility χ diverges as φ→ 1.
2. Consumers exhibit a risk neutral behavior, in the sense that qω → πω (i.e.
σ → 0)
The convergence of the EMM q to the empirical measure π implies, by Eq. (5) that the
marginal utility of consumption in each state is proportional to the price of commodity in
that state, with a state independent proportionality constant.
The susceptibility χ diverges also upon approaching the unstable region with ǫ < 0,
but the market is not complete (i.e. φ < 1) neither σ vanishes, on the boundary of the
unstable region for ǫ < 0. The reason for the divergence of χ for ǫ < 0, is that arbitrage
opportunities arise, corresponding to portfolios ~z with divergent weights, which deliver
boundless consumption in some states. The evolution of the probability distribution of
final consumption as the economy approaches the unstable region for ǫ < 0, is shown in
Fig. 2.
Specific results for any particular choice of the probability distribution πω, the utility
function u(c) and of the distribution of prices pω can be derived solving Eqs. (25 – 30)
given in appendix A.1. Here we confine our discussion to the representative case of πω =
1/|Ω|, constant relative risk aversion utility u(c) = (cγ − 1)/γ with γ = 1/2 and bimodal
distribution of prices, i.e. pω = 1± ̺ with probability 1/29.
Fig. 3 shows the behavior of R, φ, σ and χ for different values of ǫ > 0, as a function of
n. This illustrates how the equilibrium changes when the repertoire of financial instruments
expands. Even though our picture refers to equilibrium results, it is tempting to interpret
sensitivity wrt to other parameters. For instance, the variation of the portfolios ~z for a small change
rωi → r
ω
i + δri of returns, corresponds to a change c
ω
→ cω+ δ~r ·~z/pω in consumption and, to leading order,
to a change
E[u(c+ δc)] = E[u(c)] + E[u′(c)/p]δ~r · ~z +O(δ~r2)
in the utility. Hence the sensitivity to the specification in returns is given by
1
N
NX
i=1
∂zi
∂δri
˛˛
˛˛
˛
δ~r=0
= E[u′(c)/p]χ.
9It might be interesting to note that in the limit γ → 0 where u(c) → log c, the portfolio ~z → 0 vanish
for all ǫ > 0. This can be verified from the first order conditions of the original problem Eq. (3).
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Figure 2: Probability density of consumption cω for ǫ = −0.01 for n = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 1.75 and
1.86. The probability distribution broadens as n increases approaching the value nc ∼= 1.92
where arbitrage opportunities appear. The distribution refers to the case discussed in the
text: πω = 1/Ω, u(c) = 2(
√
c − 1), with a bimodal distribution of prices, i.e. pω = 1 ± ̺
with probability 1/2 and ̺ = 0.2.
this in terms of slow dynamics induced by technological innovation in the finance sector 10,
the number of traded assets (i.e. φ) increases and it saturates to a value which approaches
the number of states Ω as ǫ→ 0. Correspondingly, the EMM draws closer to the empirical
measure π (i.e. σ ց n). This is accompanied by a rise in the susceptibility χ, which
gets steeper and steeper as ǫ decreases. Interestingly, the total volume of assets bought
by consumers, and hence the expected revenue R of banks, has a non-monotonic behavior,
which is more and more pronounced as ǫ→ 0. This suggests that, for a fixed risk premium
ǫ, innovation in the financial sector is profitable only when n is not too large. The increase
in the average trading volume of an existing trading instrument, when a new instrument
is introduce, signals the presence of non-trivial complementarity effects, when n is small
enough. On the other hand, for larger values of n, the expansion of the repertoire of
instruments brings about a reduction in the volume zi of trading in already existing assets,
an indication of saturation of the financial market.
3 Risk premium and competitive prices of assets
Indeed, the risk premium ǫ is not an independent variable, but it rather depends on the
stock of instruments which banks have at their disposal. There are several possible argu-
10Slow here means that we assume that the economy converges to the equilibrium for each N in a time
which is much shorter than that for the introduction of the N + 1st financial instrument.
10
 0.05
 0.1
 0.01  0.1  1  10  100
σ
n
 0
 0.5
 1
 0.01  0.1  1  10  100
φ
n
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.01  0.1  1  10  100
V
n
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 0.01  0.1  1  10  100
χ
n
Figure 3: Behavior of the economy as a function of n, for different values of ǫ > 0: market
completeness φ (top - left), total volume V = R/ǫ (top - right), distance between the EMM
and the empirical measure σ (bottom - left) and susceptibility χ (bottom - right). Curves
refer to ǫ = 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 (from bottom to top for σ and from top to bottom for the
other plots).
ments supporting this view. Here we focus on a very simple mechanism, which arises from
the fact that banks themselves can buy assets to hedge the risk of new financial instru-
ments they introduce. In other words, each unit of a new asset rωN+1 can be backed by a
portfolio ~w of existing assets, which banks can optimize to reduce the risk. It is reasonable
to assume that the portfolio is composed of traded assets only, i.e. those with zi > 0,
the other ones being illiquid. Hence banks have K = Ωφ assets at their disposal and the
larger is the stock of existing traded assets the smaller will the residual risk associated with
the new trading instrument be. Indeed this argument goes for all assets and it ultimately
implies that, if the risk premium ǫ is proportional to non-diversifyable risk, then ǫ should
decrease with n. In other words, when n increases, the economy should follow a trajectory
in the (n, ǫ) plane of Fig. 1, with ǫց n. This is consistent with the expectation of markets
“spiraling toward the theoretically limiting case of zero marginal transactions costs and
dynamically complete markets” [3]. The results of the previous section, however, imply
that when markets approach completeness their stability gets eroded at the same time.
Hence the path to complete markets leads indeed to financial instability.
Though this expectation is rather general, the present framework allows us to provide
a concrete realization of this mechanism. Let us imagine a financial sector where banks
value financial instruments on the basis of a simple mean variance utility function
υ(θ) = E[θ]− γ
2
E
[
(θ − E[θ])2] (10)
11
for any contingent claim θω and with γ the (absolute) risk aversion coefficient. When
issuing the N + 1st instrument, banks need to evaluate a contingent claim
θωw = −rωN+1 +
∑
i:zi>0
wir
ω
i (11)
where rωN+1 is the return which the bank should deliver to consumers, for each unit of
the N + 1st instrument which they sell, and the second term is what the bank will receive
from the portfolio ~w of assets it has built in order to hedge the new instrument. Since
E[ri] = E[rN+1] = −ǫ/Ω, the expected utility is
υ(~w) =
ǫ
Ω
(
1−
∑
i:zi>0
wi
)
− γ
2
E
[
(θw − E[θw])2
]
. (12)
We restrict our attention to portfolios ~w with
∑
iwi = 0. This implies that, in order
to hedge the new instrument, the bank will need to buy and sell other assets from and to
other banks, but that the net trading at t = 0 is zero11. Hence ~w represents trading in the
interbank market.
Hence, banks will find the portfolio ~w which minimizes the residual risk Σ2(~w) =
E
[
(θw − E[θw])2
]
. Competition in the financial sector will then drive the risk premium to
the limit of vanishing banks’ profits, i.e. min~w υ(θw) = 0. This implies that
ǫ
Ω
= γmin
~w
Σ2(~w). (13)
The problem in Eq. (13) can again be tackled with the same techniques we used to
derive the results in previous sections. We refer the interested reader to appendix A.2, and
state the results:
In a competitive financial industry, where banks use mean-variance profit
functions, the risk premium which is charged to consumers is
ǫ =
γ
2
(1− φ) (14)
and it vanishes in the limit of complete markets.
As the market becomes complete, both the volume of trading in the inter-
bank market and the interbank susceptibility χw diverge.
The first part of the statement reflects the expectation that transaction costs should
vanish as the theoretical limit of complete markets is approached. The second part indicates
11Alternatively, one can think of ~w as being a replicating portfolio used only for (level 1) evaluation and
not really traded.
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Figure 4: Susceptibility χ (left) and volume V = R/ǫ (right) of consumers’ portfolios (Eqs.
8, 9) as a function of n, along the two trajectories depicted in Fig. 1. The risk premium ǫ is
determined as in Eq. (13) with γ = 0.05 (dashed line) and 0.1 (full line). The susceptibility
χw and the weights of hedging portfolios diverge, as φ→ 1, according to Eq. (15).
that, in this limit, the volume of trading in the interbank market diverges. More precisely,
one finds that ∑
i
w2i =
φ
1− φ, χw =
δw
δh
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=
φ
γ(1 − φ) (15)
where the definition of χw is analogous of that given in Eq. (9) for χ. The volume implied
by hedging each new financial instrument diverges as the market becomes complete12.
Two trajectories of the economy in the (n, ǫ) plane, derived from Eq. (14) for risk
aversion coefficients γ = 0.05 and 0.1, are shown in Fig. 1. Fig. 4 reports the value
of χ and V along these lines. All these trajectories ultimately terminate on the line of
complete markets (φ → 1), which separates the no-arbitrage from the unstable region.
As this line is approached the portfolio ~z of consumers becomes unstable, but the volume
V = R/ǫ of consumers portfolios (Eq. 8) remains finite. Hedging and pricing in the
financial industry becomes even more problematic. Not only the susceptibility χw, but
also the weights wi of hedging portfolios diverge as φ→ 1, as specified by Eq. (15). Each
12Alternatively, one may assume that banks maximize υ(~w) without the constraint
P
i wi = 0. This leads
to very similar results, with ǫ = γ
2Ω
(1 − φ) smaller by a factor Ω. Furthermore, at the optimum one findsP
i wi < 0. This means that the strategy which maximizes banks expected profit entails a net sale of “old”
financial instruments, for each unit of the new one. This excess supply, however, has no counterpart that
can absorb it, in the present model.
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new financial instrument engenders trading volumes, on other assets, which diverge as the
market becomes complete.
4 Conclusion
The main result of this paper is that, even in the best of all possible worlds – i.e. in a regime
of perfect competition, where full information is available to all market participants – the
proliferation of financial instruments potentially leads to instability at the system level.
Instability is quantified in terms of the susceptibility, i.e. the response of the equilibrium
to a perturbation or mis-specification in the underlying parameters of the model. As the
market approaches completeness, the susceptibility diverges.
The reason why the divergence of the susceptibility χ is at the root of financial insta-
bility goes along the following argument. The mathematical model we are discussing is
a rather idealized picture of reality. Still, one may think it is a zeroth order approxima-
tion of real financial markets, because different parties can learn or figure out what the
equilibrium should be. However, when the susceptibility χ is large, a small inaccuracy in
the estimate of statistical parameters of prices may result in a sizeable deviation of the
portfolio ~z from the optimal one. In the case when the market interaction is repeated many
periods, investors may fail to correctly learn how to invest optimally if the susceptibility
is large. This is because statistical errors, which are unavoidable in practical situations,
will be amplified by their learning behavior if χ is large enough. This, arguably, is the
origin of the results in Ref. [11]: The onset of the large fluctuations is not related to the
particular adaptive learning scheme assumed, but rather to the nature of the equilibrium
which agents are trying to learn.
Second, we find that as the repertoire of financial instruments expands, the risk pre-
mium decreases, as suggested in Merton and Bodie [3]. The equilibrium then approaches
the theoretical limit of complete markets, which is plagued by the instability of the portfolio
of consumers. In the specific implementation of this picture which we have presented, the
decrease of risk premia when the number of traded assets increases, entails that replicating
portfolios which are used to hedge new instruments, have weights whose absolute size with
n. This requires trading volumes among banks in the financial industry which diverge as
the market approaches completeness. Such interbank market itself becomes less and less
stable (i.e. with a divergent susceptibility) as the theoretical limit of complete markets
is approached. It’s tempting to put this result in relation with the explosion of trading
in credit derivatives among financial institutions, which we have witnessed in recent years
(see e.g. [5]).
The extension of this approach to more interesting and realistic cases of not perfectly
liquid market and asymmetric information is an interesting avenue of future research. At
a qualitative level, both these effects entail market imperfections which would displace the
equilibrium from the one with perfect competition and full information. Within a na¨ıve
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linear response theory, it is reasonable to assume that, given the results discussed here, the
effects of market imperfections will be more and more severe the closer the economy is to
one with complete markets. This suggests that the proliferation of financial instruments
may exacerbate the effects of market imperfections, or call for tighter regulations in order
to prevent an escalation in their effects.
A The statistical mechanics approach
The typical properties of solutions of Eq. (3), where rωi are i.i.d. random variables with
variance 1/Ω, satisfying the constraint Eq. (1) for all i, is derived from the study of the
partition function
Z(β, x0) =
∫
~z≥0
d~z
∫
~x≥0
d~x
∏
ω
eβu(x
ω/pω)δ
(
xω − x0 −
N∑
i=1
zir
ω
i
)
. (16)
This defines a Gibbs measure
P (~z) =
1
Z(β, x0)
eβ
P
ω u((xω−x0−
PN
i=1 zir
ω
i )/pω) (17)
over portfolios ~z. For large β this is dominated by portfolios ~z for which the utility is
maximal. Therefore
max
~z≥0
Eπ
[
u
(
1 +
∑
i zir
ω
i
pω
)]
= lim
β→∞
1
βΩ
logZ(β, x0 = 1). (18)
The partition function also provides information on the volume V (n, ǫ) of portfolios zi
which violate the no-arbitrage condition. Indeed with β = x0 = 0 we have
Z(β = 0, x0 = 0) =
∫
~z≥0
d~z
Ω∏
ω=1
θ
(
N∑
i=1
zir
ω
i
)
= V (n, ǫ)
with θ(x) =
∫∞
0 dx
′δ(x−x′) being one if x ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. Therefore, the knowledge
of the statistical properties of Z(β, x0) provides us with a characterization of the solution
of both problems13.
Eπ[u(c)] =
1
Ω
∑
ω u(c
ω) is a random variable, which depends on the draw of the partic-
ular realization rˆ ≡ {rωi } of the returns of instruments and of commodity prices ~p = {pω}.
In this respect, u(cω) can be regarded as weakly dependent random variables (the only
dependence arises from Eq. (1), with first and second moment. Hence, Eπ[u(c)] satisfies
the law of large numbers, i.e. it converges, as Ω→∞ to a constant, which is almost surely
13Note that, strictly speaking, the limit β → 0 of Z(β, 0) diverges, as the integrals are unbounded. This
divergence is easily cured by introducing a cutoff zi ≤ Z in the integrals, and then letting Z →∞.
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independent of the specific realization of market returns rˆ and commodity prices ~p. This
is reflected in the fact that the explicit calculation of logZ in effect depends on quantities
which satisfy laws of large numbers, and depend only on the first two moments of the
distribution of returns rωi .
The explicit calculation of the expected value of logZ over the realization of the returns
and prices follows precisely the same steps as those outlined in detail in [15], and will not
be repeated here.
A.1 The optimal investment problem
The final result, for x0 = 1 and β →∞, is given by the solution of the reduced problem
lim
N→∞
〈
E
[
u
(
1 +
∑N
i=1 zir
ω
i
pω
)]〉
rˆ,~p
= max
G,κ,λ,σ,χ,χˆ
ψ(G,κ, λ, σ, χ, ν) (19)
where the average is taken over the realization of instruments rˆ and commodity prices ~p
and the function ψ is given by
ψ = n
〈
max
z≥0
[
(tσ − ǫλ)z − ν
2
z2
]〉
t
+
n
2
Gν + κλ− χσ
2
2
− 1
2
χλ2 (20)
+
〈
max
c≥0
[
u(c)− (cp − 1 + κ+
√
nGt)2
2χ
]〉
t,p
.
Here 〈. . .〉t stands for expected values taken over a Gaussian random variable t, with mean
zero and unit variance, and, in the last term, 〈. . .〉t,p contains an additional expectation
over the distribution of prices p = pω.
Before discussing the meaning of the different parameters entering into ψ, it is worth
to notice that the variables z and c which appear in the maximization problems of Eq.
(20) are indeed the variables zi and c
ω = xω/pω which appear in Eq. (16). Therefore, the
distribution of t induces a distribution P{zi ∈ [z, z + dz)} = ρz(z)dz in the portfolios zi,
with
ρz(z) = 〈δ (z − z∗(t))〉t (21)
z∗(t) =
σt− ǫλ
ν
θ(σt− ǫλ). (22)
Likewise, the distribution P{cω ∈ [c, c+dc)} = ρc(c)dc of consumption levels cω, is derived
from that of t and p, as
ρc(c) = 〈δ (c− c∗(t, p))〉t,p (23)
where c∗(t, p) is the solution of the first order conditions
χ
u′(c)
p
= cp − 1 + κ+
√
nGt (24)
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In brief, the statistical mechanics approach transforms an optimization problem in N
variables, when N → ∞, into the maximization of a function over a finite number of
variables, six in our case. The meaning of these variables can be elucidated by inspection
of the first order conditiond for the maximization of ψ (the saddle point equations), which
are given by
λ = 〈u′(c∗)/p〉t,p (25)
ν =
1√
nG
〈u′(c∗)t/p〉t,p (26)
σ2 =
〈
[u′(c∗)/p]2
〉− 〈u′(c∗)/p〉2 (27)
G = 〈z∗2〉t (28)
χ =
n
σ
〈z∗t〉t (29)
κ = λχ+ nǫ〈z∗〉t. (30)
The function ψ can be computed numerically to any degree of accuracy, and the maxi-
mization problem in the r.h.s. of Eq. (19) can be carried out numerically. Still it is possible
to derive a great deal of insight from inspection of the structure of the maximization prob-
lem.
A.1.1 Interpretation of the parameters and the susceptibility
For what we have said above, the parameters G and σ/λ have a direct interpretation in
terms of the original problem. G is introduced, in the calculation imposing the constraint
G =
1
N
N∑
i=1
z2i (31)
and indeed Eq. (28) equates G to the average of the squares of the portfolio weights.
Likewise, σ/λ is the standard deviation of the equivalent martingale measure across states,
which is also a measure of the distance of qω from the real measure πω = 1/Ω.
A similar interpretation is possible for the parameter χ. This enters in the calculation
of Z(β, 1), as
χ =
β
2N
N∑
i=1
(
zi − z′i
)2
(32)
where ~z and ~z′ are two samples from the Gibbs measure Eq. (17). As β → ∞ the two
solutions converge to the same one, with their squared distance vanishing as 1/β. There
is a more intuitive interpretation of χ as a response function or susceptibility:
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Consider the variation of the portfolio weights ~z, under the change u(cω) → u(cω) +∑N
i=1 hizi in the utility
14. Let Z(β, x0,~h) be the modified partition function, which is
obtained introducing an additional factor eβ
~h·~z inside the integral of Eq. (16). The value
of the portfolio weight zi can now be computed as follows
zi = lim
β→∞
1
β
∂
∂hi
logZ(β, 1,~h)
∣∣∣∣
~h=0
= lim
β→∞
1
Z(β, 1,~h)
∫
~z≥0
eβEπ[u]+β
~h·~zzi
∣∣∣∣∣
~h=0
. (33)
Therefore
1
N
N∑
i=1
∂zi
∂hi
= lim
β→∞
1
β
∂2
∂h2i
logZ(β, 1,~h)
∣∣∣∣
~h=0
(34)
= lim
β→∞
β
N
N∑
i=1
[
E
β,~h
[
z2i
]− E
β,~h
[zi]
2
]∣∣∣∣∣
~h=0
(35)
Here E
β,~h
[. . .] stands for the expectation on the Gibbs measure eβEπ[u]+β
~h·~z, and the second
line arises from explicitly taking the derivative of zi as given in the second equality in Eq.
(33). Comparing Eqs. (32) and (35) one concludes that Eq. (9) holds true. χ conveys
information on the sensitivity of the solution to the specification of the problem parameters.
A very similar argument can be made for the variation of ~z under a change rωi → rωi + δri
with hi = Eπ[u
′(cω)/pω]δrωi = λδri, which corresponds to a perturbation of the initial
(t = 0) prices of instruments.
A.1.2 Wealth conservation and no-arbitrage condition
Taking the expected value of Eq. (24), and using Eqs. (25,30), we find
1 = 〈c∗p〉t,p + ǫn〈z∗〉t (36)
As it should, the initial unit wealth goes partly to buy the consumption good and partly
to banks, as a revenue for selling financial instruments.
If Eq. (24) is multiplied by u′(c∗)/p, then, upon taking the expected value and using
Eqs. (25,...,30), one can derive the relation〈
u′(c∗)
p
(c∗p− 1)
〉
t,p
= 0. (37)
We recall that u′(cω)/pω is proportional to the equivalent martingale measure. Hence, this
relation takes the form of a no-arbitrage condition: the value of the portfolio used to buy
consumption at t = 1 equals the initial wealth, i.e.Eq [cp] = Eq[1] = 1.
14For small ~h, this corresponds to a change in the perception of the utility of instrument i = 1, . . . , hN
or, to leading order in ~h, to a change in the returns rωi → r
ω
i + hi/Eπ[u
′(cω)/pω] +O(~h2).
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Relations (36) and (37) constitute important consistency checks of the theory and show
that important micro-economic constraints are built in the mathematical structure of the
problem (19).
A.1.3 The limit of complete markets
The property 〈f(t)t〉t =
〈
∂f
∂t
〉
t
of gaussian integrals, applied to Eqs. (26,29), leads to
ν =
〈
u”(c∗)
χu”(c∗)− p2
〉
p,t
(38)
χ =
n
ν
Prob{z∗ > 0} = φ
ν
(39)
we have used the expressions for z∗ and c∗ in Eqs. (22,24). Hence,
φ =
〈[
1− p
2
χu”(c∗)
]−1〉
p,t
. (40)
Market becomes complete when φ = νχ→ 1. From Eq. (40), it is clear that φ→ 1 when
χ → ∞. Leaving aside pathological cases (i.e. if −∞ < u”(c) < 0), the converse is also
true, χ→∞ when φ→ 1.
On the other hand, Eq. (39) implies that
φ = χν = n
∫ ∞
t0
dt√
2π
e−t
2/2, with t0 =
ǫλ
σ
.
With ǫ = 0 and σ > 0, this implies t0 = 0 and φ = n/2. However, Eq. (40) requires φ ≤ 1,
which means that limǫ→0 σ > 0 can only hold for n ≤ 2. For n > 2 the constraint φ ≤ 1
requires that the extreme of integration t0 in the above integral be finite and positive, i.e.
that σ → 0 for ǫ→ 0.
This implies that the line of complete markets is located at ǫ = 0 for n ≥ 2, and that
σ = 0 on this line.
A.2 The arbitrage region
As discussed in appendix A, the volume V of portfolios which violate the no-arbitrage
condition, is given by
1
N
log V = lim
β→0
1
N
logZ(β, x0 = 0).
So the evaluation of this quantity is directly obtained from the previous calculation. Taking
the average over the realization of the market, we find
h ≡ lim
N→∞
1
N
〈log V 〉 (41)
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= max
ω,χ,λ
[
H1(ω, χ, λ) + max
σ,ρ,ν
H2(σ, ρ, ν|ω, χ, λ)
]
(42)
where
H1 =
1
n
〈
log
[
1
2
erfc
(√
nωt+ nλ√
2nχ
)]〉
t
(43)
H2 =
1
2
[
(ν − σ2 − ρ2)χ+ νω]+ ρλ+〈log ∫ ∞
0
dze−
ν
2
z2+(σt+ǫρ)z
〉
t
. (44)
First notice that if ~z belongs to the volume, then also a~z does. Indeed h has the required
invariance property for zi → azi. Indeed, under the transformation χ → a2χ, ω → a2ω,
λ→ aλ. ρ→ ρ/a, σ → σ/a and ν → ν/a2, both H1 and H2 are invariant.
The limit where the volume shrinks to zero is given by the case where the distance
between two solutions goes to zero, i.e. χ → 0. In this limit, inspection of the saddle
point equations reveals that ω, λ attain finite limits, whereas the other parameters behave
as ν = v/χ, σ = s/χ and ρ = r/χ. The leading behavior of h must be of the type log χ,
hence the terms proportional to 1/χ must cancel. From this we derive the equation
h˜ = lim
χ→0
hχ = H˜1 + H˜2 (45)
H˜1 = − ω
2n
〈
θ(t+ t0)(t+ t0)
2
〉
t
, t0 =
√
n
ω
λ (46)
H˜2 =
1
2
[vω − s2 − r2] + rλ+
〈
max
z≥0
[
−v
2
z2 + (ts+ rǫ)z
]〉
t
(47)
=
1
2
[vω − s2 − r2] + rλ− v
2
〈
z∗2
〉
t
+ s 〈tz∗〉t + rǫ 〈z∗〉t (48)
The saddle points on r, s and v yield λ = r − ǫ 〈z∗〉t, ω =
〈
z∗2
〉
t
and s = 〈z∗t〉t which
yield H˜2 =
s2+r2
2 at the saddle point. In addition, z
∗ = sv (t + ξ)θ(t + ξ), with ξ = rǫ/s.
Expressing everything in terms of ξ, we find
t0(ξ) =
√
n
I2(ξ)
[
ξI0(ξ)
ǫ
− ǫI1(ξ)
]
, In(ξ) = 〈θ(t+ ξ)(t+ ξ)n〉t .
and we can reduce the saddle point problem to one in the two variables s and t0
h˜ =
s2
2
[
1 +
ξ2
ǫ2
− I2(ξ)
nI0(ξ)2
I2 [t0(ξ)]
]
notice that the saddle point equation in s readily implies h˜ = 0 as assumed at the beginning.
The equation ∂h˜∂ξ = 0 yields a second equation, which determines the relation between n
and ǫ, on the boundary of the unstable region.
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A.3 Risk premium and competitive prices of assets
The problem in Eq. (13) can again be studied with the same techniques as above. In this
case, one can build a partition function
Q(β) =
∫
d~we−βH
with
H =
γ
2
Ω∑
ω=1
(
ζωN+1 −
K∑
i=1
wiζ
ω
i
)2
+ ǫ
K∑
i=1
wi
where ζωi = r
ω
i + ǫ/Ω are the fluctuations of asset returns. The sum on i runs only on
the traded assets (those with zi > 0). The number of these is given by K = φΩ. The
derivation below assumes that these can be considered as drawn independently, with the
constraint
∑
ω ζ
ω
i = 0, and it neglects the possible bias due to the selection of consumers.
In the case
∑
iwi = 0, the residual risk is given by
min
~w
Σ2(~w) = − 1
Ω
lim
β→∞
logQ(β)
In the limit of large Ω this limit satisfies a law of large numbers, i.e. it converges to its
expectation on the realization of the variables ζωi . We skip the derivation, which follows
exactly the same lines as in Ref. [15], and state the result. The problem, in the case∑
iwi = 0, reduces to the evaluation of the saddle point of the function
Γ =
γ(Λ2 − g − 1)
2(1 + γg)
+ λΛ+
1
2
gν +
1
2
χr +
φ
2ν
(
λ2 − r)
Here we use the same symbols for variables which play an analogous role as in the other
problems. The first order conditions, readily yield λ = Λ = 0, ν = γ(1 − φ),
g ≡
K∑
i=1
w2i =
φ
1− φ, and χ =
φ
γ(1− φ) .
The value of the residual risk, when computed at the saddle point value, is given by
Σ2 = γ2Ω(1− φ), which leads to Eq. (14)
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